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The recent adoption, expansion, and application of comparative
negligence concepts to causes of action based on negligence have
raised a basic question of whether principles of comparative fault
should be applied to strict products liability actions. Traditionally,
contributory negligence has not been a defense to the strict liabil-
ity cause of action.' However, because plaintiff's negligence no
longer acts as a total bar to recovery and because the harshness of
contributory negligence has been diluted by comparative fault, the
role of plaintiff's conduct in the strict products liability action is be-
ing exposed to judicial reconsideration.
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1. See generally Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443 (1972); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228,
71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS, § 402A,
comment n at 356 (1965).
A flurry of judicial2 and academic authority3 has presented argu-
ment for the application of comparative fault to the strict products
liability action. This article will consider the nature of the term
defect and the judicial characterization of the strict liability cause
of action. An analysis of the "defect" concept and of the nature
of the strict products liability cause of action indicates that the
cause of action is not based on principles of fault. If doctrines of
comparative negligence are applied to the products liability action,
an inevitable collision of fault and no-fault concepts will occur.
EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH THE MEANING OF Defect
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
The varied and overlapping theoretical bases for tort recovery
offer dynamic and challenging considerations. The three basic
theories of recovery are intentional tort, negligence, and strict
liability. Although each of the bases of liability requires multiple
elements for a prima facie cause of action, one element of each
theory of recovery generally predominates because of the inherent
complexities of defining, limiting, and characterizing the scope of
the tort. These elements tend to draw a disproportionate share of
analytical concern. For example, recovery on a theory of inten-
tional tort often depends on the concept of intent. In negligence,
the dynamics of liability frequently pivot upon questions of duty.
In the strict liability action for abnormally dangerous activities,
emphasis tends to be upon the difficult, and frequently humorous,
task of defining the element of abnormality. Thus, the resolutions
of intent, duty, and abnormality often determine liability itself.
The dynamics of defining and characterizing the concepts of
intent, duty, and abnormality are paralleled in strict products liabil-
ity cases by efforts to establish a functional definition of defect. In
fact, the inherent elasticity and resilience of the word defect has
frequently caused the defect requirement to become the major
2. E.g., Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d
393 (1974); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See also
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
3. E.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42
J. AIR L. & Com. 107 (1976). See Feinberg, The Applicability of a Compar-
ative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Sec-
tion 402A of The Restatement of Torts 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42
INS. CouNs. J. 39 (1975); Freedman, The Comparative Negligence Doctrine
Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate
Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INS. L.J. 468; Schwartz, Strict Lia-
bility and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171 (1974).
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determinant of liability. In order to characterize the theoretical
basis governing liability in a products case, the myriad efforts of
judges, lawyers, and scholars to establish a functional definition of
defect must be considered. An analytical approach to defining
defect can help to answer the greater question of whether the prod-
ucts liability action is a fault or no-fault concept.
Courts have repeatedly recognized the difficulty of reducing the
requirement of defect to verbal certainty. 4 In Baker v. Chrysler
Corp., the court stated: "The word 'defect' is not capable of precise
definition in all cases; 'no definition [of defect] has been formulated
that would resolve all cases or that is universally agreed upon.'-5
,Most courts adopting the theory of strict liability in products cases
accept the basic premise of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.6 This section establishes liability whenever a
product is in a defective, unreasonably dangerous condition. In
clarifying these terms, comment g states: "The rule stated in this
Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."7 Com-
ment i of section 402A further suggests: "The article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics."8 The definitional contours offered by section 402A of the Re-
statement have given rise to a wealth of interpretation and critical
analysis.0
4. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1974); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973).
5. 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (1976).
6. Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976) (construing
Missouri law); Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533
P.2d 717 (1975); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135
(1970); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Jag-
min v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973). These
cases have been the subject of criticism. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning ol "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYRAcusE L. REV. 559, 572 (1969).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
8. Id. comment i at 352.
9. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
The judicial approach to defining defect has been far from
uniform. Some jurisdictions have followed the mandates of section
402A and have required proof of a defective condition which is un-
reasonably dangerous. 10 In these jurisdictions added concern has
been directed toward defining unreasonably dangerous." Some
courts have addressed the issue of defect by considering whether
the product deviates from the standards or norm of similar prod-
ucts,1 2 while others have tested for defect by determining whether
the product is reasonably fit for its intended purpose.
13 Still
others14 have adopted the multiple-factor test suggested by Profes-
sor Wade.15
It is apparent the courts have not agreed on whether the term
unreasonably dangerous tends to clarify the meaning of defective
or whether the term is redundant and therefore imposes an undue
burden upon the plaintiff. In Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,10
the court adopted a dangerously defective standard which is sup-
posed to be the equivalent of a finding that the product is unreason-
ably dangerous. In that case the court held:
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of De-
fect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of
Information, 48 TEX. L. REv. 398 (1970); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of Defect in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYP.AcusE L. REv. 559 (1969); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973);
Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler, Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 425 (1974).
10. E.g., Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d
717 (1975); Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1973);
Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973).
11. See, e.g., Becker v. Aquaslide'N' Dive Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 479, 341
N.E.2d 369 (1975); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974);
Metal Window Products Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774
(1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum, 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d
794 (1975). One case has held that the terms defective and unreasonably
dangerous are synonymous. Borel v. Fibreboard Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d
168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
13. Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970);
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969).
14. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972).
15. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-17
(1965).
16. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable
person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowl-
edge of its harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the
seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive
knowledge of the condition of the product.
1 7
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted a standard which
borrows from the best of all definitional worlds. In Seattle-First
National Bank v. Tabert,'1 the court suggested that if a product is
unreasonably dangerous, it is necessarily defective. The court indi-
cated that liability would be imposed under section 402A if a product
is not reasonably safe. The court reasoned the product must be un-
safe to an extent beyond that which would be reasonably contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer. The evaluation of the product in
terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer
would allow the trier of fact to consider the intrinsic nature of the
product. More importantly, the court concluded that in determining
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer a number of
factors would be considered-for example, the relative cost of the
product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect,
and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.19
The multiple-factor analysis has also been applied in other juris-
dictions. Texas has approached the issue in a manner similar to
17. Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036 (1974). The standard followed in the
Phillips case has also been applied in the federal courts. Borel v. Fibre-
board Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973); Welch
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967); Dorsey v. Yoder
Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
18. 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
19. Id. at 779. This approach is reflective of Professor Wade's earlier
suggestions that the question of defect should be governed by the follow-
ing determinants: (1) the usefulness and desirabilitiy of the product-
that is, its utility to the user and to the public as a whole; (2) the
safety aspects of the product-that is, the likelihood it will cause injury
and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) the availability of a sub-
stitute product which would meet the same need and will be safer; (4)
the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
with6ut impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product; (6) the user's anticipated awareness of
the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of
general public knowledge of the product's obvious condition or because
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; (7) the feasibility
of the manufacturer's spreading the loss by increasing the price of the
product or by carrying insurance. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Lia-
bility for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
the evaluation of duty in negligences cases-that is, by balancing
the risk and seriousness of harm against the precautionary burden
of avoiding harm.20  In recent Oregon decisions, the courts enter-
tained a factor analysis approach similar to that suggested by Pro-
fessor Wade. 21 In Roach v. Kononen, the court stated that the
design of the product must be dangerously defective.22 The court
held that in strict liability the concern is the condition (dangerous-
ness) of an article which is designed in a particular way, while in
negligence the issue is the reasonableness of the manufacturer's ac-
tions in designing and selling the article. The factors which the
court suggested would be necessarily considered in deciding the
question of defect are the utility to the user, the consumer's use of
the product, the seriousness of injury, and the cost of avoiding the
defect. The court suggested that it considered the term danger-
ously defective equivalent to unreasonably dangerous.
2 3
In sharp contrast to the approaches discussed above is the holding
of Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp.24 In Berkebile the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested it would completely reject
standards based upon what the reasonable consumer is expected
to know or what the reasonable manufacturer is expected to foresee
concerning consumers who use his product. Instead, the court
noted:
[T]he sole question here is whether the seller accompanied his
product with sufficient instructions and warnings so as to make his
product safe. This is for the jury to determine. The necessity and
adequacy of warnings in determining the existence of a defect can
and should be considered with a view to all the evidence. The jury
should review the relative degrees of danger associated with use
of the product since a greater degree of danger requires a greater
degree of protection.
25
The foregoing judicial analysis suggests that defect is considered
within the realm of traditional negligence concepts by defining the
degree of warning in proportion to the danger which necessitates
the warning itself.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the defect
requirement was being decided on the basis of a reasonable manu-
facturer standard, much like a traditional negligence test. How-
20. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972).
21. Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976); Roach
v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
22. 269 Or. 457, 463, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974).
23. Id.
24. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
25. Id. at 902.
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ever, in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,28 the court considered the
defect requirement and specifically rejected the unreasonably dan-
gerous component.2 7  In Cronin, a bread delivery truck collided
with another vehicle. The impact of the collision broke an alumi-
num safety hasp holding bread trays in place in the rear of the
truck. The trays struck the driver's back and hurled him through
the windshield; he sustained serious personal injuries. Among
other claims, the defendant argued that the jury instruction erro-
neously failed to include that the defect must be found unreasonably
dangerous. The defendant contended that failure to include such
a requirement would make the manufacturer an insurer of his
product.
In considering whether a plaintiff must prove a product both
defective and unreasonably dangerous, the court acknowledged the
purpose of the unreasonably dangerous requirement as a limit on
liability, but found that the limit placed too great a burden on the
plaintiff. The court stated:
The result of the limitation, however, has not been merely to
prevent the seller from becoming an insurer of his products with
respect to all harm generated by their use. Rather, it has burdened
the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negli-
gence . . . . In fact, it has been observed that the Restatement
formulation of strict liability in practice rarely leads to a different
conclusion than would have been reached under the laws of negli-
gence .... Yet the very purpose of our pioheering efforts in this
field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent
in pursuing negligence . . . and thereby "to insure that costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers .... ",28
Although the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
need prove only that the product was defective, it failed to provide
a guide to what makes a product defective. 29 However, the court
26. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
27. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
28. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42 (citation
omitted).
29. See id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
The court believed that useful precedents existed to give content to the
defect requirement. However, as the foregoing discussion indicates, de-
fect is interpreted in many different ways. For a good summary of the
case law on the various theories of defect, see Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). Significantly the Cronin
case considered the utility of providing qualifying language which would
characterize and define the term defect. The decision reflects the greater
expressed a desire to purge the defect requirement of its "neg-
ligence complexion" 30 and reaffirm the risk distribution policy
underlying the doctrine, by stating that products liability is not
a fault-based concept and that elements which ring of negligence
must be eradicated. 31
Although the courts have not been able to provide a precise
definition of the term defect, the lack of verbal precision has
resulted in a flexibility of the strict liability cause of action similar
to the characteristic resilience of negligence law. However, the
basic distinction between a cause of action based on strict liability
and a cause of action based on negligence has been preserved for
purposes of perpetuating the public policy considerations which
serve as the foundation for the strict liability theory of recovery.
As the court stated in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.: "It
is not necessary . . . to define the outer limits of the term 'defect.'
• . . Suffice it to say that the concept is a broad one. The range
of its operation must be developed as the problems arise and by
courts mindful that the public interest demands consumer protec-
tion."3 2 Although no consensus exists concerning the definition of
the term defect, there is definite agreement that the concept does
not pivot upon principles of legal fault.33
Judicial reluctance to inject precise meaning into the term might
flow from the fact that important issues relating to the products
liability cause of action can be decided apart from the defect deter-
mination. For example, in most instances the determination relat-
ing to defect is not inextricably intertwined with considerations
governing either defenses or the extent to which plaintiff's conduct
might mitigate damages. In general, the courts have tended to
decide each issue by referring to public policy rather than by rely-
problem presented to the courts in situations in which efforts to reduce
elements of the cause of action to verbal clarity become impractical be-
cause the qualifying language invariably clashes with the basic theory of
liability.
30. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr: at 442. The Cronin
decision was followed in Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599,
304 A.2d 562 (1973), and in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.
2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). Some courts have specifically rejected the
holding of Cronin. E.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974).
31. 8 Cal. 3d at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
32. 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
33. For a comprehensive review of California's judicial approach to de-
fining the term defect, see Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App.
3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976). See also Comment, Reasonable Product
Safety: Giving Content to the Defectiveness Standard in California Strict
Products Liability Cases, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 492. (1976).
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ing upon a common theory of liability which would serve as a basis
for resolving all issues common to the cause of action. How-
ever, the pending issue of whether the doctrine of comparative
negligence should be invoked in a strict products liability action
to reduce the plaintiff's damages in proportion to the plaintiff's
culpability will require that the judiciary provide and be guided
by a clear basis of liability.
In an effort to decide the issue of whether comparative fault
should apply to the strict liability cause of action, a consideration of
the characterizations of products liability by courts and academic
authorities is essential. Some authorities view strict liability as the
conceptual equivalent of the law of warranty.34  Other decisions
have stated that recovery based on strict liability is nothing more
than a modified form of negligence per se.35 A third category of
substantial authority suggests that the strict liability cause of action
is a new creature in the law of tort providing liability irrespective
of fault.3 6 The initial characterization of the theoretical basis of
liability is essential in resolving the question of whether compara-
tive fault should apply to the strict liability cause of action.
Courts have frequently characterized the theory of liability as
based on the law of warranty. Strict products liability was orig-
inally imposed from an express and implied warranty perspective.
However, because of the contractual principles of privity, notice,
waiver, and disclaimer, courts were required to engage in concep-
tual gymnastics in order to impose strict liability on the manufac-
turers of defective products.37  Section 402A of the Restatement
was adopted to minimize the types of legal theories which would be
necessary to circumvent the barriers of warranty.38 That section
did away with the obstacles of privity, disclaimer, and notice. The
courts were therefore able to pierce the barriers created by con-
tract principles which had frequently insulated manufacturers
from strict liability actions.
3 9
34. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
35. Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393
(1974); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
36. See generally Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528
P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A, comment m at 355 (1965).
37. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
39. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
An interesting contrast to the contention that section 402A of the
Restatement is a derivative of warranty law is provided by authori-
ties who have suggested the liability which flows from a cause of
action based on 402A is not absolute. These authorities suggest
the cause of action rests on theoretical foundations of fault.40 This
conclusion is based on the contention that section 402A is similar
to a statute which dictates a standard of care and that noncom-
pliance results in liability analogous to negligence per se. How-
ever, a basic distinction from negligence law is that the cause
of action based on section 402A of the Restatement does not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove the manufacturer had or should have
possessed knowledge of the defect. Neither does this theory re-
quire proof of specific negligent acts by the manufacturer.
41
The third theory of liability, which represents the majority
view, is that section 402A liability is not analogous to recovery
based on warranty or negligence, but rather is liability irrespective
of fault.42 The legal characterization of the strict liability cause
of action will invariably control the question of whether compara-
tive fault should be considered for purposes of mitigating damages
based on the nature and degree of plaintiff's culpability. However,
the courts' characterization of the central element of the cause of
action and of the action itself is not fault oriented. In fact
current authority is that the courts are proceeding on the assump-
tion that the action is not based on fault.
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT AS A BASIS FOR DEFENSES IN A
STRICT LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION
In a strict liability cause of action the plaintiff's conduct is
considered in various contexts. The plaintiff's conduct may be ex-
amined to determine if the plaintiff used the product in an abnormal
40. Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
41. See Wade, supra note 40; Feinberg, The Applicability of a Compara-
tive Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section
402A of The Restatement of Torts 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INs.
COuNS. J. 39 (1975).
42. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m at 355 (1965).
Little v. Maxam, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 373 (Ill. 1970); Bachner v. Pearson, 479
P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88
Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353 (Okla. 1974). Several cases repudiate the notion that fault is an
element of a products liability cause of action.
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or unintended manner or if plaintiff engaged in assumption of the
risk. However, early characterizations of the strict liability cause of
action and subsequent cases focusing upon the relation of the plain-
tiff's conduct to the cause of action have unequivocally stated that
plaintiff's negligence is not a defense to the action.
43
Misuse of the Product
Plaintiff's actions constituting misuse of the product (as distin-
guished from acts or omissions which are responsible for a lack of
knowledge concerning a product's defect) are a recognized defense
to a strict liability action.44 Some courts have found the product
not defective when the plaintiff's misuse is unforeseeable to the
defendant.45 Furthermore, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,46 the California Supreme Court held that plaintiff must prove
he was using the product in a foreseeably intended manner. Thus,
although product misuse is a recognized defense, it is adequate only
when the defendant cannot foresee the particular type of misuse.
Numerous cases have allowed recovery on the ground that if the
use is foreseeable, it is intended and normal. For example, in
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,47 the California Supreme Court held
that collision of vehicles was a reasonably foreseeable occurrence
and should be considered in the design and manufacture of a
product. The court stated: "The design and manufacture of prod-
ucts should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but with
recognition of the realities of their everyday use."48 Other courts
have held that collisions are emergency situations which must be
considered by manufacturers of products and that such occurrences
do not constitute abnormal or unintended uses of the products.
4 9
43. E.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1968).
44. Although this proposition is a variant of contributory negligence, it
is a recognized defense. Prosser has stated the defendant is not liable be-
cause the plaintiff has not established causation if the latter has misused
the product. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 48 (1966). See, e.g., Dooms v. Stewart Bolling & Co., 68
Mich. App. 5, 241 N.W.2d 738 (1976).
45. E.g., McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1968).
46. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
47. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
48. Id. at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
49. See generally Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 510, 518, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1973).
Assumption of Risk
The distinction between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence which is significant in the products liability cause of
action is clearly expressed in comment n of section 402A of the
Restatement which provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability.50
Thus assumption of risk is recognized as an affirmative defense to
the strict liability cause of action.51
Because the strict liability cause of action evolved from the law
of warranty, it logically follows that plaintiff's negligence should
not be a defense. Any semblance of unfairness to the defendant
is diluted by the doctrine of assumption of risk and by considera-
tion of abnormal or unintended use of the product. In other words,
even though plaintiff's conduct is referred to as contributory negli-
gence and is not an appropriate defense, plaintiff's conduct is a
defense if it reaches the level of assumption of risk or if it consists
of abnormal or unintended use of the product.5 2 Frequently
plaintiff's actions cannot be categorized, and misuse of the product
serves as a basis for an assumption of risk defenseA Prosser sug-
gests that an unforeseeable abnormal or unintended use of the
product should preclude liability because proximate cause will not
be sufficiently established.5 4
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
51. Id. See also O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248
(1968); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1976); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
52. Although Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975), abolished implied assumption of risk in negligence ac-
tions, there was no suggestion a similar application would be extended to
the strict liability cause of action. See Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60
Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
53. McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 407, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493,
496 (1968). See Hilton, The Strict Products Liability Case-Complaint, De-
lenses and Instructions, 48 ORE. L. REV. 192 (1969); Lascher, Strict Liability
in Tort For Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960).
54. W. PRossER, LAW or TORTS § 103, at 668 (4th ed. 1971).
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It is significant to note assumption of the risk and misuse of the
product, if established by the defendant, act as a total bar to plain-
tiff's recovery. Defenses based on plaintiff's conduct are not avail-
able to mitigate damages. Cases have consistently held contribu-
tory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict liability action.55
Adopting Comparative Negligence in California
Until recently, in California the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence was harsh, for it acted as a total bar to plaintiff's recovery
in a negligence cause of action. However, the California Supreme
Court sought to mitigate this harshness by adopting the pure form
of comparative negligence. In the landmark case of Li v. Yellow
Cab Co.,"6 the court held that a plaintiff's contributory negligence
would be considered only for purposes of reducing plaintiff's recov-
ery instead of acting as a total bar to recovery. More specifically
the case held liability is in proportion to fault.
The Li case has given rise to the significant question of whether
the comparative fault concept should be extended to strict liability
causes of action for purposes of mitigating plaintiff's damages in
proportion to his fault. If the Li decision is found applicable to
the strict liability cause of action, plaintiff's conduct would no
longer act as a total bar to recovery, but rather would be applied
only for purposes of diminishing the plaintiff's damages in propor-
tion to his or her own culpability. The basic thrust of the Li deci-
sion is that contributory negligence is no longer a bar to plaintiff's
recovery; thus much of the prior harshness of applying the doctrine
of contributory negligence is removed by utilizing comparative
negligence. The argument has followed that comparative fault
should apply to the strict liability cause of action because it would
only diminish plaintiff's recovery and no longer act as a total
bar.
5 7
The case of Horn v. General Motors Corp.rs reflects growing
55. See generally Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443 (1972); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228,
71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
402A comment n at 356 (1965).
56. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
57. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark in Horn v. General Motors
Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
58. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
judicial sensitivity to the issue of whether comparative fault should
apply to the strict liability cause of action. In Horn the plaintiff was
injured during a collision when her face hit exposed prongs of the
steering column of her automobile. The defendant contended that
plaintiff's failure to use the seatbelt constituted misuse of the prod-
uct. The trial court ruled such evidence inadmissible on the ground
that plaintiff's contributory negligence was not an issue. On appeal
the California Supreme Court stated that this evidence was prop-
erly excluded because at the time of the trial, contributory negli-
gence was not a defense to the strict liability cause of action and
because the plaintiff's actions fell far short of the technical require-
ments of assumption of risk.59 In a footnote to the holding, the
court noted that the ramifications of Li would not be considered
at that time because Li had been decided after the trial of the case.
The court stated: "Under these circumstances we find no compel-
ling reason to apply the rule of comparative negligence to this case
which was tried long before our decision in Li and in which on
this appeal the issue of comparative negligence was neither briefed
nor argued."6 0 In dissent Justice Clark argued that the doctrine
of comparative negligence as promulgated by Li should apply to
a strict products liability cause of action. Justice Clark's dissent
is based primarily upon policy considerations in Li. A basic premise
of his argument is that products liability is a fault doctrine. The
dissent draws language from Li, stating:
The doctrine [contributory negligence] is inequitable in its opera-
tion because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to
fault .... The basic objection to the doctrine [of contributory
negligence] grounded in the primal concept that in a system in
which liability is based on fault the extent of fault should govern
the extent of liability-remains irresistible to reason and all intelli-
gent notions of fairness. 61
In addition Justice Clark suggested that the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence, as enunciated in the Li decision, should be appli-
cable to strict products liability actions because "[s] trict or product
liability is a fault doctrine-not an absolute or no-fault doctrine
.... While the injured plaintiff is not required to prove the manu-
facturer is negligent, he must prove the manufacturer is at fault."'62
Although the majority of the California Supreme Court would not
address the issue of whether to apply comparative fault to the strict
59. Id. at 370 n.2, 551 P.2d at 398 n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83 n.2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 372, 551 P.2d at 405, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 85 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
62. Id. at 373, 551 P.2d at 406, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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liability cause of action, it is apparent the issue will be presented
in the future. Ostensibly, those arguing that the doctrine should
apply to strict liability actions will present the viewpoint expressed
by Justice Clark in the Horn case that strict liability or product
liability rests on a theoretical foundation of fault and that the dic-
tates of the Li case should apply. 3
Numerous commentators have suggested that plaintiff's conduct
should be considered in a strict products liability action for purposes
of mitigating damages. However, it is important to examine the
rationale offered by those contending that comparative negligence
should be applied to the strict liability cause of action. Some have
suggested that products liability "is not absolute but is based on
the social fault of marketing defective products," and therefore it is
logical and consistent to consider plaintiff's fault in relation to the
defendant's conduct.0 4  Other authorities also support application
of comparative fault to the strict liability cause of action.65 These
authors suggest that no difficulty exists in considering the nature
and extent of the plaintiff's conduct in relation to the defendant's
culpability. However, most of the writers fail to take cognizance of
the body of case law which unequivocally states that the defend-
ant's fault or culpability is not a factor in the strict liability cause
of action. In essence, those proposing the adoption of comparative
fault in the strict liability action are actually suggesting a compari-
son of a fault doctrine (comparative negligence) to a no-fault doc-
trine (strict products liability).
FAULT OR NO-FAULT-CHARACTERIZING THE TORT
WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE
In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court held that:
Logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel against
the retention of the doctrine rendering contributory negligence a
63. Id. at 372-79, 551 P.2d at 405-10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 85-90 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
64. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 270 (1976).
65. Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AnR
L. & CoM. 107 (1976); Feinberg, The Application of a Comparative Negli-
gence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of
the Restatement of Torts 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNS. J.
39 (1975); Freedman, The Comparative Negligence Doctrine Under Strict
Liability: Defendant's Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate Cause" of
Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INS. L.J. 468; Schwartz, Strict Liability and
Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974).
complete bar to recovery-and that it should be replaced in this
state by a system under which liability for damage will be borne
by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their
respective fault.66
The essence of the Li holding is the weighing of fault for purposes
of proportioning damages. In resolving the question of applying
the conceptual equivalent of Li to the strict liability cause of
action, the crucial question which now will be presented to the
courts is whether the strict products liability action rests on a
theoretical foundation of fault. If the strict liability action does not
proceed on a fault basis, it would be illogical to consider the nature
of the plaintiff's conduct to determine liability in proportion to
fault. Although the dissenting opinion in Horn v. General Motors
Corp. suggested that strict liability is liability based on fault,0 7 this
suggestion is a significant contradiction of the law in the majority of
jurisdictions which has characterized the cause of action as pro-
ceeding irrespective of fault. Connecticut, in a case devoted to
characterizing the theory of liability stated: "An action based on
strict liability is to be distinguished from liability predicated on a
breach of warranty or simple negligence. It is not based on fault.
It is a doctrine imposed to meet the exigencies of modern life."' 8
Nevada has adopted a similar view as reflected in a case holding
that:
A product being defective gives rise to strict tort liability even
though faultlessly made if it was unreasonably dangerous for the
manufacturer or supplier to place the product in the hands of a user
without giving suitable and adequate warnings .... The doctrine
of strict liability for an injury caused by a defective product applies
even though the supplier has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of his product. 69
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that:
[T]he focus of attention in strict liability cases is not on the con-
duct of the defendant, but rather on the existence of the defective
product which causes injuries. Liability is attached, as a matter
of policy, on the basis of the existence of a defect rather than on
the basis of the defendant's negligent conduct.
0
66. 13 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
67. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
68. De Felice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Sup. 164, 255 A.2d 636, 638
(1969).
69. General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 367, 498 P.2d 366, 369 (1972).
See also Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 206, 484 P.2d 573, 575 (1971), stat-
ing: "[It makes no difference whether the manufacturer was or was not
negligent, acted in good faith, or even took every possible precaution to
prevent defects."
70. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alaska 1970) (emphasis
added).
[VOL. 14: 337, 1977] Strict Products Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW RfVIEW
An Arizona court has stated:
[W]e fail to agree that strict liability has not circumvented the
"fault concept." The Restatement clearly makes the vendor liable
although he has "exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product." It does not matter that the seller has done
"the best he can" if the product is defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous. 71
Clearly substantial authority exists supporting the view that the
strict liability cause of action is no-fault in nature. Significantly,
California courts have been even more forceful than other courts
in unequivocally characterizing the strict liability cause of action
as resting on a no-fault foundation. This characterization is strik-
ingly apparent in the landmark California case, Ault v. Inter-
national Harvester Co.
72
The Ault factual setting raised dynamic legal issues which
demanded succinctly articulating the basis and theory of recovery
in a strict liability cause of action. In Ault the plaintiff suffered
injuries when his vehicle abruptly left the road after an aluminum
steering gearbox failed. The plaintiff sought to introduce evidence
of subsequent remedial measures taken on behalf of the defendant
manufacturer which consisted of substituting malleable iron for
aluminum in the manufacture of the gearbox.73 The defendant
objected to the admissibility of evidence of remedial measures on
the basis of section 1151 of the California Evidence Code which
provides:
When after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary
measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event.7 4
This language and plaintiff's offer of evidence of remedial measures
taken by the defendant manufacturer crystalized the legal issue
of whether strict products liability actions cling to conceptual
equivalents of culpability. If products liability was based on
defendant's fault or culpable conduct, the evidence would not be
allowed.
75
71. Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 307, 475 P.2d 964, 966
(1970).
72. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d at 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
73. Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
74. CAL. EVM. CODE § 1151 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
75. The anomalous, paradoxical, and humorous texture of contemporary
However, the Ault court held that evidence of subsequent repairs
or remedial measures would be admissible and that section 1151
is inapplicable to the strict liability action. More importantly, the
court held that no culpable conduct is implied in a products liabil-
ity cause of action. The court stated:
[Tihe language and the legislative history of section 1151 demon-
strate that the section is designed for cases involving negligence
or culpable conduct on the part of the defendant, rather than to
those circumstances in which a manufacturer is alleged to be
strictly liable for placing a defective product on the market.70
In Ault the court clearly indicated that culpability is not a deter-
minant of the strict liability cause of action and that a manufac-
turer may, without fault, place a defective product on the mar-
ket.
77
It is difficult to reconcile the Ault characterization of liability
with Justice Clark's statement in Horn that "strict product lia-
bility is a fault doctrine . . . ,,T7 Furthermore, the conclusions
reached by one writer that " [ t] he doctrine of strict liability in tort
retains the fault basis for liability" 79 and that "[t]he concept
requires proof of a form of culpable conduct",80 cannot be recon-
tort law is reflected in the nature of the litigant's arguments. The plain-
tiffs, for purposes of seeking recovery, contended that the defendants were
not culpable in placing a defective product on the market. In contrast,
the defendant requested the court to consider the act of selling a defective
product with a view toward fault and culpability.
76. 13 Cal. 3d at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
77. See also Bill Loeper Ford v. Hites, 47 Cal. App. 3d 828, 121 Cal. Rptr.
131 (1975); Recent Development, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288.
78. 17 Cal. 3d at 373, 551 P.2d at 406, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 85 (Clark, J.,
dissenting (emphasis added).
79. Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 107, 110 (1976).
80. Id. at 118. Significantly, all those supporting the application of com-
parative negligence to the strict liability action (see notes 2 & 3 supra) refer
to the Wisconsin case of Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967), in support of their contention. In Dippel the court characterized the
strict liability action as a variant of negligence per se. In the recent case of
Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Fodds, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974),
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the earlier characterization of the
strict product liability action as a remedy sounding in negligence by stat-
ing:
Strict liability in this state at least means negligence as a matter of
law or negligence per se, and the effect of the adoption of the rule
of strict liability based on this negligence in effect shifts the burden
of proof from the plaintiff of proving acts of negligence to the
defendant to prove he was not negligent in any respect.
The authorities which have cited either Dippel or Powers must realize that
the characterization of the strict liability action by the Wisconsin courts as
an action charged with the law of negligence and basic fault concepts in-
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ciled with the theoretical basis of liability recognized by most
courts. These contentions appear to be unsupported characteriza-
tions of the theory of liability employed to satisfy a pre-existing
conclusion that comparative negligence should apply to the strict
liability cause of action. Such conclusions are clearly in direct con-
flict with cases such as Ault, which have held that neither fault
nor culpability is necessary to a section 402A cause of action. It
would be illogical and inconsistent to apply comparative fault to
a cause of action which the California Supreme Court has strongly
suggested is not based on fault.
A theory of liability should provide a resolution of the legal is-
sues; the legal issues should not result in ad hoc characterizations
of the theory of liability. Flagrant disregard for the controlling
nature of the theoretical basis of liability is reflected by a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska. In Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,8 1 the court applied comparative
negligence to the strict liability action. The court suggested that
theories of liability are unimportant in resolving the question of
whether to apply comparative negligence to strict liability actions.
The court stated that "whether the action is characterized as negli-
gence, warranty or in tort, the plaintiff must prove essentially the
same elements to recover. '8 2 This statement does not demon-
strate a fundamental awareness of the significant disparities among
varied theories of recovery. Bald assertions which conclusively
abandon essential differences in theories of liability should never
serve as a method of resolving important legal issues.8
herent therein is alien to the characterization of the basis of liability offered
by most other jurisdictions. (See notes 32-36 supra). In addition Califor-
nia courts have taken the added effort in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), to purge the conceptual
equivalents of negligence from the strict products liabilitk, action. The sig-
nificant disparity between the theoretical basis of liability in Wisconsin
compared to that in California and other jurisdictions should preclude any
authoritative reference to the Wisconsin cases for purposes of applying com-
parative negligence to the strict product liability action.
81. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
82. Id. at 45.
83. In addition to the simplistic and inaccurate reasoning by the ma-
jority of the court that there is no difference in theories of liability and
therefore no problem in applying comparative negligence to strict liability,
a concurring opinion was offered by Justice Rabinowitz. In his concurring
opinion Justice Rabinowitz presents the novel idea of adopting a doctrine
of comparative causation as a means of circumventing theoretical obstacles
CONCLUSION
In California, comparative fault cannot logically and consistently
be applied to the strict liability cause of action. Prejudice to a
plaintiff would result if the jury was required to determine the
plaintiff's fault and to compare it to the defendant's conduct in
a cause of action not requiring that a jury consider the existence,
nature, or extent of defendant's culpability. How can comparative
fault exist in a cause of action which proceeds irrespective of fault?
What can a jury compare the plaintiff's fault with if the defendant's
fault is not at issue? If the jury has not determined the nature,
extent, or degree of the defendant's fault but has merely concluded
the product is defective, how can it reduce the plaintiff's damages
in proportion to respective fault?
The application of "comparative" fault to the strict products liabil-
ity cause of action would prejudice a plaintiff because of the
unusual and impossible demand placed upon a jury. In essence we
would ask a jury that if they find the defendant's product was defec-
tive, irrespective of fault, they should reduce the plaintiff's damage
by considering the plaintiff's culpability in proportion to the defend-
ant's non-culpability. This requirement may be a feat which is
beyond the prowess of an American jury.
encountered when applying comparative negligence to strict liability. In
support of this suggestion the concurring opinion would require "the trier
of fact to compare the harm caused by the product's defect with the harm
caused by the claimant's own negligence." Id. at 47 (Rabinowitz, J., concur-
ring). However, the suggestion fails to recognize the fact that plaintiffs
degree of culpability would be meaningful only if contrasted to the nature
and degree of defendant's fault. For example, suppose the particular defect
in a product consisted of a negligent failure to warn of dangers related to
the use of a product. How would a jury consider the plaintiff's conduct
in relation to discovering the dangers without engaging in a consideration
of the degree of liability which should attach to the failure to warn of the
risks?
